In wireless networks, it is often assumed that each individual wireless terminal will faithfully follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation-except, perhaps, for a few faulty or malicious ones. Wireless terminals, when owned by individual users, will likely do what is the most beneficial to their owners, i.e., act "selfishly". Therefore, an algorithm or protocol intended for selfish wireless networks must be designed.
INTRODUCTION
In wireless ad hoc networks, it is commonly assumed that, each terminal contributes its local resources to forward the data for other terminals to serve the common good, and benefits from resources contributed by other terminals to route its packets in return. However, the limitation of energy supply, memory and computing resources of these wireless devices raise concerns about this traditional assumption. A wireless device owned by an individual user may prefer not participating in the routing to save its energy and resources. Therefore, if we assume that all users are selfish, providing incentives to wireless terminals is a must to encourage contribution and thus maintains the robustness and availability of wireless networking systems. The question turns to how the incentives are designed. Consider a unicast routing and forwarding protocol based on the least cost path (LCP): each terminal is asked to declare its cost of forwarding a unit data for other terminals, and the least cost path connecting the source and the target terminal is then selected. A very naive incentive is to pay each wireless terminal its declared cost. However, the individual wireless terminal may declare an arbitrarily high cost for forwarding a data packet to other terminals hoping to increase its payment. Here, we would like to design a payment scheme such that every wireless terminal will report its cost truthfully and always forward others' traffic out of its own interest to maximize its profit. This payment scheme is called strategyproof in the literature since it removes speculation and counterspeculation among wireless terminals. Always forwarding others' traffic is a dominant strategy of each terminal as it maximizes a user's profit no matter what other users do. Unfortunately, it has been shown in [24] that there does not exist a dominant strategy solution in which every node always forwards others' packets in an ad hoc routing and forward game. However, there does exist a strategyproof payment scheme for the routing subgame.
The most well-known and widely used strategyproof payment method is so called VCG mechanism family by Vickrey [21] , Clarke [6] , and Groves [10] . A VCG mechanism uses an output that maximizes the social efficiency, i.e., the total valuations of participating agents. Several mechanisms [15, 7, 1, 24] , which essentially all belong to the VCG mechanism family, have been proposed in the literature to ensure that each network agent will report its cost truthfully for unicast. In these mechanisms, the least cost path, which maximizes the social efficiency, is used for routing. To support a communication among a group of users, multicast is more efficient than unicast or broadcast, as it can transmit packets to destinations using fewer network resource, thus increasing the social efficiency. A truthful multicast routing protocol, which selfish wireless terminals will follow, is composed of two components: (1) the tree structure that connects the sources and receivers, and (2) the payment to the relay nodes in this tree. Multicast poses a unique chal-lenge in designing strategyproof mechanisms: it is NP-hard to find the tree structure with the minimum cost, which in turn maximizes the social efficiency. A range of multicast structures, such as the least cost path tree (LCPT), the pruning minimum spanning tree (PMST), virtual minimum spanning tree (VMST) and Steiner tree, were proposed to replace the optimal multicast tree. In this paper, we will not redesign the wheel; instead, we show how payment schemes can be designed for existing multicast tree structures so that rational selfish wireless terminals will follow the protocols for their own interests.
This paper focuses on the design of truthful payment schemes for the multicast routing subgame. The main contribution is as follows. Firstly, for each of these widely used multicast structures, we show that a simple application of VCG payment method is not strategyproof: a wireless terminal may have incentives to lie about its cost to increase its profit. This is due to the fundamental difference between unicast and multicast: it is NP-hard to find the minimum cost multicast tree that span the sources and receivers, while the least cost unicast path can be found in polynomial time. Secondly, we design a strategyproof payment scheme for each of these multicast structures and prove that the payment of our schemes is the minimum among any truthful payment schemes for a given specific multicast tree structure. To the best of our knowledge, our protocols are the first truthful mechanisms that do not rely on VCG mechanisms for routing in selfish networks. We study both link cost and node cost. For link cost, [24] shows that special care must be taken when designing a mechanism so that the links will report their non-private link types truthfully. In this paper, we assume that such a cryptographic mechanism is in place (e.g, [24] ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce some preliminaries and related work in Section 2. We also present our communication model and the problems to be solved in this paper. We study the strategyproof mechanism for link weighted network in Section 3 and node weighted network in Section 4. Simulation results are presented in Section 5. We conclude our paper in Section 6 by pointing out some possible future work.
PRELIMINARIES AND PRIOR ART

Preliminaries
In designing efficient, centralized or distributed algorithms and network protocols, the computational agents are typically assumed to be either correct/obedient or faulty (also called adversarial). Here agents are said to be correct/obedient if they follow the protocol correctly. In contrast, economists design market mechanisms in which it is assumed that agents are rational. The rational agents respond to well-defined incentives and will deviate from the protocol only if it improves their gain.
A standard economic model for the design and analysis of scenarios in which the participants act according to their own selfinterests is as follows. Assume that there are n agents, which could be the wireless devices in a wireless ad hoc networks, the computers in a peer-to-peer networks, or even network links in a network. Each agent i, for i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, has some private information ti, called its type, e.g., the cost to forward a packet in a network environment. All agents' types define a type vector t = (t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n ).
A mechanism defines, for each agent i, a set of strategies A i . For each strategy vector a = (a 1 , · · · , a n ), i.e., agent i plays a strategy ai ∈ Ai, the mechanism computes an output o = o(a1, · · · , an) and a payment vector p = (p1, · · · , pn), where pi = pi(a1, · · · , an) is the money given to the participating agent i. For each possible output o, agent i's preferences are given by a valuation func-
) denote the utility of agent i at the outcome of the game, given its preferences ti and strategies profile a = (a1, · · · , an) selected by agents. A common assumption in mechanism design literature, and one which we will follow in this paper, is that agents are rational and have quasi-linear utility functions. The utility function is quasi-linear
An agent is called rational, if it always maximizes its utility by finding its best strategy. For a multicast routing protocol, the set of strategies A k for a terminal k in a direct revelation mechanism is the set of possible costs that terminal k could declare. The utility of the terminal k on a tree connecting the source and the receivers is the payment p k for terminal k minus its cost c k . A strategy ai is called dominant strategy if it maximizes the utility regardless of what other agents do, i.e.,
for all a i = ai and all strategies b−i of agents other than i. Here
a n ) denotes the vector of strategies of all other agents except i.
Hereafter, we only consider direct-revelation mechanism in which the only actions available to agents are to make direct claims about their preferences vi to the mechanism. A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if reporting valuation truthfully is a dominant strategy. Another very common requirement in the literature for mechanism design is so called individual rationality or voluntary participation: the agent's utility of participating in the output of the mechanism is not less than the utility of the agent if it did not participate at all. For convenience, let
e., each agent j = i reports its type t j except that the agent i reports type b. Then, IC implies that, for each agent i,
Arguably the most positive result in mechanism design is what is usually called the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism by Vickrey [21] , Clarke [6] , and Groves [10] . The VCG mechanism applies to maximization problems where the objective function is simply the sum of all agents' valuations. A direct revelation mechanism M = (o(t), p(t)) belongs to the VCG family if (1) the output o(t) computed based on the type vector t maximizes the objective function g(o, t) = P i vi(ti, o), and (2) the payment to agent i is pi(t) =
Here hi() is an arbitrary function of t −i . A VCG mechanism is always truthful [10] . Under mild assumptions, VCG mechanisms are the only truthful implementations to maximize the total valuations [9] .
Although the family of VCG mechanisms is powerful, but it has its limitations. To use VCG mechanism, we have to compute the exact solution that maximizes the total valuation of all agents. This makes the mechanism computationally intractable in many cases. Notice that replacing the optimal algorithm with non-optimal approximation usually leads to untruthful mechanisms if VCG payment method is used [15] . To make the mechanism tractable, the output method o(), and the payment method p() should be computable in polynomial time. Notice that it is NP-hard to find the tree with the minimum cost for multicast. Thus, the VCG mechanism using optimum minimum cost tree as output is not polynomially computable if P = N P .
In summary, we want to design strategy-proof multicast protocols for a selfish wireless network with the following properties. 1) Incentive Compatibility (IC): an agent will reveal its true cost to maximize its utility no matter what the other agents do; 2) Individual Rationality (IR) : an agent is guaranteed to have non-negative utility if it reports its cost truthfully; and 3) Polynomial Time Com-putability (PC): all computations (the computation of the output and the payment) are done in polynomial time.
Prior Art on Selfish Routing
How to achieve cooperation among selfish terminals in network was previously addressed in [4, 12, 14, 3, 5, 18, 19] . In [14] , nodes, which agree to relay traffic but do not, are termed as misbehaving. Their protocol avoids routing through these misbehaving nodes. In [4, 12, 5, 3] , a secure mechanism to stimulate nodes to cooperate is presented. The key idea behind these approaches is that terminals providing a service should be remunerated, while terminals receiving a service should be charged. Each terminal maintains a counter, called nuglet counter, in a tamper resistant hardware module, which is decreased when the terminal originates a packet and increased when the terminal forwards a packet.
Routing has been an important part of the algorithmic mechanismdesign from the very beginning. Nisan and Ronen [15] provided a polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism for optimal unicast route selection in a centralized computational model. In their formulation, the network is modelled as an abstract graph G = (V, E). Each edge e of the graph is an agent and has a private type t e , which represents the cost of sending a message along this edge. Their mechanism is a VCG mechanism by using the Least Cost Path (LCP) as its output. Feigenbaum et. al [7] then addressed the truthful low cost routing in a different network model. They assume that each node k incurs a transit cost c k for each transit packet it carries. Their mechanism again is the VCG mechanism. They gave a distributed method such that each node i can compute a payment p k ij > 0 to node k for carrying the transit traffic from node i to node j if node k is on the LCP LCP(i, j). Anderegg and Eidenbenz [1] recently proposed a similar routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks based on VCG mechanism again. They assumed that each link has a cost and each node is a selfish agent. Feigenbaum et. al [8] , by assuming a fixed multicast structure, designed a strategyproof mechanism that selects a subset of receivers (each with a privately known willing payment) and then shares the cost of the multicast tree providing the service among the selected receivers so budget balance is achieved.
When applying VCG mechanisms to complex problems such as multicast, a problem emerges: even finding the optimal outcomes is computationally intractable. A critical observation made by Nisan et al. [16] and other researchers is that if the optimal outcome is replaced by a polynomial-time computable structure then the mechanism using payment computed based on VCG method is no longer necessarily truthful! This phenomena is almost universal. To address this, Nisan and Ronen [16] introduced a notion of feasible truthfulness that captures the limitation on agents imposed by their own computational limits. They showed that under reasonable assumptions on the agents, it is possible to turn any VCG-based mechanism into a feasibly truthful one, using an additional appeal mechanism. In this paper, we use a totally different approach by using a payment scheme other than the VCG scheme, and we do not assume any computational limits on the agents.
Communication Model
In this paper, as did in the literature, we study two different models of wireless networking: link weighted and node weighted networking. For both models, usually the communication links are needed to be symmetric due to the following requirement: each receiver has to send an acknowledgment packet directly to the sender after it received the data. Thus, in this paper, we consider all communication links as undirected. Actually, our results can apply to case when the link is directed with some minor modification.
In a link weighted network, each communication link incurs a cost when a message is sent over it and the communication link is an agent, e.g., the marginal cost of this link transmitting the data. For example, in a cellular networks, it could be the cost of using the channel. For node weighted network each communication terminal will incur a cost when it has to relay a message for other node. Typical example of a node weighted network is the wireless ad hoc network with fixed transmission range. Throughout this paper, we always assume that the network is bi-connected, which implies that if we remove the agent the network is still connected. This assumption is necessary to prevent some nodes from being monopoly and charging arbitrary cost, in addition to increase network robustness.
It is well known that finding the minimum cost multicast tree (MCMT) is NP-hard for both link weighted networks and node weighted networks. So several multicast structures were proposed in the literature to approximate MCMT. In practice, two types of multicast structures are used to meet the requirements of different applications: source based multicast tree and share based multicast tree. For those applications like online movie, they usually have one or only a few senders and lots of receivers. Therefore, we often use a source based multicast tree in which receivers only receive messages but do not send them. On the other hand, many applications have lots of active senders, such as distributed interactive simulation applications, and distributed video-gaming (where most receivers are also senders). In this case, the share based tree is used to increase the scalability.
In this paper, we study how to design truthful payment schemes for the most widely used multicast trees, including source based trees and shared trees for both edge weighted and node weighted networks. The following assumptions are adopted in this paper: (1) all receivers will relay the data packets for peer receivers for free if it is asked to do so; (2) each relay agent (terminal or link) has a privately known cost to relay a transit traffic for other terminals and the cost is independent of the number of its children in the multicast tree; (3) the candidate relay agents (the agents besides the source and the receivers) will not collude with each other to improve their gains; (4) all agents are rational; (5) an agent receives zero payment if it is not in the multicast structure; and (6) the source of the multicast will pay the selected relay terminals. If we relax any of first five assumptions, we would have to design different mechanisms. If the sixth assumption is not met, we need design a payment sharing [23] scheme to share the payments fairly among all receivers. Regarding the collusion, notice multicast is a special case of unicast. If we consider the unicast, in reference [22] , the authors proved a negative results about the non-existence of truthful payment if general collusion happens, i.e., there is no truthful payment scheme that can prevent any two agents from improving their gains by collusion with each other.
Problem Statement
Consider any communication network G = (V, E, c), where V = {v 1 , · · · , v n } is the set of communication terminals, E = {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e m } is the set of links, and c is the cost vector of all agents. Here agents are terminals in a node weighted network and are links in a link weighted network. Given a set of sources and receivers Q = {q0, q1, q2, · · · , qr−1} ⊂ V , the multicast problem is to find a tree T ⊂ G spanning all terminals Q. For simplicity, we assume that s = q 0 is the sender of a multicast session if it exists. All terminals or links are required to declare a cost of relaying the message. Let d be the declared costs of all nodes, i.e., agent i declared a cost di. Based on the declared cost profile d, we should construct the multicast tree and decide the payment for the agents. The utility of an agent is its payment received, minus its cost if it is selected in the multicast tree. Instead of reinventing the wheels, we will still use the previously proposed structures for multicast as the output of our mechanism. Given a multicast tree, we will study the designing of strategyproof payment schemes based on this tree.
Given 
MULTICAST IN LINK WEIGHTED COM-MUNICATION NETWORKS
In this section, we discuss how to conduct truthful multicast when the network is modelled by a link weighed communication graph. We assume the communication network is modelled by an undirected graph G = (V, E, c). Here, the value of c i is only known to each individual link e i .
We specifically study the following three structures: least cost path tree (LCPT), pruning minimum spanning tree (PMST), and link weighted Steiner tree (LST). Notice that the first structure belongs to the family of the source based multicast tree, while the second and the third structure belong to the share based multicast tree.
Least Cost Path Tree
In practice, this is the most widely used multicast tree. Notice that, although we only discuss the using of least cost path tree for the link weighted network (i.e., the link will incur a cost when transmitting data), all results we presented in this subsection can be extended to the node weighted scenario without any difficulty.
Constructing LCPT
First, each link ei will report a cost di of forwarding the unit data, which is collected to the source node using the link-state algorithm. For each receiver q i = s, we compute the shortest path (least cost path), denoted by LCP(s, q i , d), from the source s to q i under the reported cost profile d. The union of all least cost paths from the source to receivers is called least cost path tree, denoted by LCP T (d). Clearly, we can construct LCPT in time O(n log n + m). Next we discuss how to design a truthful payment scheme while using LCPT as the output.
VCG mechanism on LCPT is not strategyproof
Intuitively, we would use the VCG payment scheme in conjunction with the LCPT tree structure as follows. The payment
We show by an example that the above payment scheme is not strategyproof. In other words, if we simply apply VCG scheme on LCPT, a link may have incentives to lie about its cost. Figure 1 illustrates such an example where link sv3 can lie its cost to improve its utility.
The payment to link sv 3 is 0 and its utility is also 0 if it reports its cost truthfully. The total payment to link sv 3 when sv 3 
Strategyproof mechanism on LCPT
Now, we describe our strategyproof mechanism that does not rely on VCG payment. For each receiver q i = s, we compute the least cost path from the source s to q i , and compute a payment p i k (d) to every link e k on the LCP(s, qi, d) using the scheme for unicast
Here |LCP(s, q i , d)| denotes the total cost of the least cost path LCP(s, qi, d). The final payment to link e k ∈ LCP T is then
The payment to each link not on LCPT is simply 0. Before we show that the above payment scheme (1) is truthful, let us illustrate it by a running example of how we pay link sv3 in Figure 1 . If link sv3 reports a cost M truthfully, then it gets payment 0 since it ∈ the LCPT. If link sv 3 reports a cost M − 2 , it is now in the LCPT (composed of links sv 3 , v 3 q 1 , and v 3 q 2 ). Its payment then becomes max(p PROOF. Clearly, when link e k reports its cost truthfully, it has non-negative utility, i.e., the payment scheme satisfies the IR property. In addition, since payment scheme for unicast is truthful, so e k cannot lie its cost to increase its payment p
by lying its cost. In other words, our payment scheme is truthful.
We then show that the above payment scheme pays the minimum among all strategyproof mechanism using LCPT as output. Before showing the optimality of our payment scheme, we give some definitions first. Consider all paths from sender s to receiver q i , they can be divided into two categories: with edge e k or not. The path having the minimum length among these paths with edge e k is denoted as LCPe k (s, qi, d); and the path having the minimum length among these paths without edge e k is denoted as
Assume there is another payment schemep that pays less for a link e k in a network G under cost profile
Thus, e k ∈ LCP T (d ). From the following Lemma 2, we know that the payment to link e k is the same for cost profile d and d . Thus, the utility of link e k under profile d by payment schemep
< 0. In other words, under profile d , when link e k reports its true cost, it gets a negative utility under payment schemep. Thus, p is not strategyproof. This finishes our proof.
LEMMA 2. If a mechanism based on a tree T with payment functionp is truthful, then for every agent
PROOF. We prove it by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a truthful payment scheme such thatp k (d) depends on d k . There must exist two valid declared costs x 1 and x 2 such that
. Without loss of generality we assume
. Now consider agent a k with actual cost c k = x2. Obviously, it can lie its cost as x2 to increase his utility, which violates the incentive compatibility (IC) property.
Notice that the payment based on p k (c) = minq i ∈Q p i k (c) is not truthful since a link may lie its cost upward so it can discard some low payment from some receivers. In addition, the payment p k (c) =
is not truthful either.
Computational complexity
Assume there are r receivers, for every terminal q i , we calculate the payment for all nodes v k ∈ LCP(s, qi, c) based on LCP(s, qi, c) using the fast payment scheme for unicast problem [22] . This will take O(n log n + m) time. So for all terminals, it will take O(rn log n + rm). Note that we can construct the least cost path tree in time O(n log n + m). A very natural question is whether we can reduce the time complexity from O(rn log n + rm) to O(n log n + m). We leave it as an open question.
Pruning Minimum Spanning Tree
For LCPT tree, each sender of the multicast group has to build the tree rooted at itself. Although it can be constructed efficiently using the information collected from unicast, still one tree has to be constructed for each possible sender. One way to alleviate this is to construct a common tree that can be used by all possible senders. Minimum cost spanning tree is a reasonable choice. Since we only need the tree to span all the nodes in the multicast group, we could further trim some branches of the MST that does not contain any receivers.
Constructing PMST
First we construct the minimum spanning tree M ST (G) on the graph G. We then root the tree M ST (G) at sender s, prune all subtrees that do not contain a receiver. The final structure is called Pruning Minimum Spanning Tree (PMST).
VCG mechanism on PMST is not strategyproof
Intuitively, we would use the VCG payment scheme in conjunction with the PMST structure. The payment to an edge e k ∈ P M ST (G) based on VCG would be as follows
We show by an example that the above payment scheme is not strategyproof. Figure 2 illustrates such an example where link q 1 v 1 has a negative utility when it reveals its true cost. 
Strategyproof mechanism on PMST
We now discuss our strategyproof payment scheme using PMST as the output. Instead of applying the VCG mechanism on PMST, we apply VCG mechanism on the MST. The payment for edge
For every edge e k ∈ P M ST (d), its payment is 0. Before prove the truthfulness and the optimality of our payment scheme, we first illustrate it by an example of how the payment to link sv 3 is computed. Clearly, the MST without using link sv 3 has total cost 3.5 and the MST when link sv 3 is considered has total cost 3. Thus, the payment to link sv 3 by payment (2) is 3.5 − 3 + 1 = 1.5 and the utility of link sv3 is 0.5.
THEOREM 3. Our payment scheme (2) is truthful and minimal among all truthful payment schemes based on PMST.
PROOF. For link
, the payment is exactly the payment based on M ST structure. Notice the payment based on M ST belongs to VCG mechanism, so it is truthful. Thus, if
then it still gets utility 0; else the M ST will keep unchanged which implies that e k is still not in P M ST . Thus, e k also don't have the incentive to lie in this case. So our payment scheme (2) is truthful.
For e k ∈ P M ST (d) our payment is same as the payment for M ST , which is a VCG mechanism. Thus, our payment is minimal among all truthful payment scheme if the output is PMST. Detailed proof is omitted here due to space limit.
Computational complexity
Obviously, we can construct the PMST in time O(n log n + m). We then analyze the time complexity of computing all links' payment in PMST. Let G\M ST (G) be the graph after removing the edges of M ST (G) from G. Call the minimum spanning tree of G\M ST (G) the second minimum spanning tree, denoted by M ST 2 (G). It was shown that the total payment to all links in the MST equals to the actual cost of the M ST 2 (G) in [2] . Also, it is not difficult to calculate payment for every link in PMST in time O(n log n + m), which is optimal.
Link Weighted Steiner Tree (LST)
It is well-known [17, 20] that it is NP-hard to find the minimum cost multicast tree when given an arbitrary link weighted graph G. For LCPT and PMST structure, while they usually work well in practice, in some extreme situations, the cost of these structures could be arbitrary larger than the optimal cost. Then it is desirable that we can find a structure such that even in worst case, the cost of structure is at most α times of the optimal. In literature, this structure is said to be a α-approximation of the optimal and α is called the approximation ratio.
Takahashi and Matsuyama [20] first gave a polynomial time algorithm that can output 2-approximation of the minimum cost Steiner tree (MCST). Then a series of results have been developed to improve the approximation ratio. The current best result is due to Robins and Zelikovsky [17] , in which the authors presented a polynomial time method with approximation ratio 1 + ln 3 2
. Takahashi and Matsuyama's algorithm is simpler and can be implemented in a distributed way, which fits the need of wireless networks. Thus, we use this algorithm instead of the algorithm with the best approximation ratio to construct multicast tree.
Constructing the LST
We first review the algorithm by Takahashi and Matsuyama:
ALGORITHM 1. (Takahashi and Matsuyama [20])
Repeat the following steps until no receiver remains:
1. Find one of the remaining receiver, say q i , that is closest to the source s, i.e., the LCP(s, qi, d) has the least cost among the shortest paths from s to all receivers.
2. Connect q i to s using the least cost path between them and contract this least cost path to one virtual vertex. Remove some edges during contracting if necessary. This is virtual source terminal for next round.
For each iteration in Algorithm 1, we call it a round. Let Pi be the path found in round i, and ti be the receiver it connects with the virtual source terminal. Given r receivers, the method terminates in r rounds. Hereafter, let LST (d) be the final tree constructed by Algorithm 1. The authors of [20] 
VCG mechanism on LST is not strategy-proof
Given a tree LST (d) approximating the minimum cost Steiner tree, a natural payment scheme would be to pay each edge based on VCG scheme, i.e., the payment to an edge e k ∈ LST (G) is
We give an example to show that this payment scheme does not satisfy IR property, i.e., it is possible that some edges have negative utility. Figure 3 illustrates the example with terminal s being the source terminal. It is not difficulty to show that, in the first round, link sq 1 is selected to connect terminals s and q 1 with cost 2; in round r, we will select link q r−1 q r to connect to q r with cost 2. Thus, the tree LST (G) will be just the path sq1q2 · · · q k , whose cost is with total cost (k + 1)(1 + ). Thus, the utility of link e1 = sq1 is ω(LST (G\e1))−ω(LST (G)) = (k+1)(1+ )−2k = k −k+2, which is negative when < k−2 k
. Thus, the payment to link sq 1 does not satisfy the incentive rationality property.
Strategy-proof mechanism based on LST
We then describe our strategyproof mechanism (without using VCG) based on LST . Instead of paying the wireless link based on the final structure LST, we will calculate a payment for each round and choose the maximum as the final payment. Let wi(d) be the cost of the path P i selected in the ith round if the cost profile is d. 3. Define the payment for edge e k in round i as
THEOREM 4. Our payment scheme based on LST is strategyproof and minimum among truthful payment schemes based on LST.
PROOF. First, for every round i, the payment scheme p i k (d) is a VCG mechanism, so e k gets maximum and non-negative utility from round i if it reveals its true cost c k . Notice the final payment scheme is the maximal of p i k (d) over all round i, so e k gets maximum and non-negative under payment scheme (3) when it reveals its true cost c k . Thus, our payment scheme is strategy-proof. Now we prove the optimality of our payment scheme. We prove by contradiction. Suppose there exists a payment schemep such that for profile d,
. From the IR property, we can assure that e k is selected under profile d. Here we argue that if
of link e k . This violates the assumption that payment schemep is truthful.
Computational complexity
For every round, the payment p i k (d) could be calculated in time O(n log n + m). There are r rounds, where r is the number of receivers, so overall complexity is O(rn log n+rm). The question left unsolved is: can we reduce the time complexity to O(n log n + m), which should be optimal if we can achieve that.
MULTICAST IN NODE WEIGHTED COM-MUNICATION NETWORKS
In this section, we discuss in detail how to conduct truthful multicast when the network is modelled by a node weighed communication graph. We specifically study the following two structures: virtual minimum spanning tree (VMST) and node weighted Steiner tree (NST). Although LCPT is a very commonly used structure in node weighted wireless networks, but its construction and strategyproof payment scheme are nearly the same as in the link weighted networks, so we omit the discussion of this structure here. Notice both VMST and NST are share-based multicast trees, which implies that the receivers could also be the sender. In practice, for those share-based trees, receivers/senders in the same multicast group usually belong to the same organization or company, so their behavior can be expected to be cooperative instead of uncooperative. Thus, we assume every receiver will relay the packet for peer receivers for free.
Virtual Minimum Spanning Tree
Constructing the VMST
Our virtual minimum spanning tree structure mimics the overlay network for the multicast. For each pair of nodes in the multicast group, we build a tunnel using the shortest cost path connecting them. Among all the tunnels, we select the minimum cost tree to connect all nodes in the multicast group. We first describe our method to construct the virtual minimum spanning tree. ALGORITHM 3. Virtual MST Algorithm
First, calculate the pairwise least cost path LCP(qi, qj, d)
between any two terminals q i , q j ∈ Q when the declared cost vector is d.
Construct a virtual complete link weighted network K(d) using Q as its terminals, where the link qiqj corresponds to the least cost path LCP(qi, qj, d), and its weight w(qiqj) is the cost of the path LCP(q
i , q j , d), i.e., w(q i q j ) = |LCP(q i , q j , d)|.
Build the minimum spanning tree (MST) on K(d). The resulting MST is denoted as V M ST (d).
For each virtual link q i q j in V M ST (d), we mark every node on LCP(qi, qj, d) as relay node. Thus, a terminal v k is a relay node iff v k is on some virtual links in the V M ST (d).
VCG mechanism on VMST is not strategy-proof
In this subsection, we show that a simple application of VCG mechanism on VMST is not strategy-proof. Figure 4 illustrates such an example where terminal v 3 can lie its cost to improve its utility when output is VMST. The payment to terminal v3 is 0 and its utility is also 0 if it reports its cost truthfully. The total payment to terminal v 3 when v 3 reported a cost
and the utility of terminal v 3 becomes u 3 (c| 3 d 3 ) = 2M − (M + ) = M − , which is larger than u 3 (c) = 0. Thus, VCG mechanism based on VMST is not strategy-proof. 
Strategyproof mechanism on VMST
Before discussing the strategyproof mechanism based on VMST, we give some related definitions first. Given a spanning tree T and a pair of terminals p and q on T , clearly there is a unique path connecting them on T . We denote such path as ΠT (p, q), and the edge with the maximum length on this path as LE ( 
p, q, T ). For simplicity, we use LE(p, q, d) to denote LE(p, q, V M ST (d)) and use LE(p, q, d|
. Following is our truthful payment scheme when the output is the multicast tree V M ST (d).
ALGORITHM 4. Truthful payment scheme based on VMST
For every terminal v
and V M ST (d| k ∞) according to the terminals' declared costs vector d.
For any edge e = q i q j ∈ V M ST (d) and any terminal v k ∈
LCP(q i , q j , d), we define the payment to terminal v k based on the virtual link qiqj as follows:
Again we first illustrate our payment scheme by a running example. Node v 3 gets payment 0 when it reports its true cost M + . When it lies its cost to M − , let us see how much we will pay. Now the VMST will have two links sq1 (corresponding to LCP(s, q 1 , d ) = sv 3 q 1 ) and sq 2 (corresponding to LCP(s, q 2 , d ) = sv 3 q 2 ). In other words, v 3 appears in two virtual links sq 1 and sq 2 
of V M ST (d ).
If v 3 is not present, then the VMST still has two links sq1 (corresponding to LCP(s, q1, d ) = sq1) and sq2 (corresponding to LCP(s, q2, d ) = sq2). Then the payment to v3 based on link sq 1 is p
Similarly, the payment to v 3 based on link sq 1 is p sq 1 v 3 = M . Thus, the final payment to node v 3 is M , which is less than its true cost M + .
THEOREM 5. Our payment scheme (4) is strategyproof and minimum among all truthful payment schemes based on VMST.
Instead of proving Theorem 5, we prove Theorem 6, Theorem 9 and Theorem 11 in the remaining of this subsection.
Before the proof of Theorem 5, we give some related notations and observation. Considering the graph K(d) and a node partition {Q i , Q j } of Q, if an edge's two end nodes belong to different node set of the partition, we call it a bridge. 
We then state our main theorems for the payment scheme discussed above. 
This finishes the proof.
OBSERVATION 1. For any cycle C in graph G, assume ec is the longest edge in the cycle, then e c ∈ M ST (G).
From the definition of the incentive compatibility (IC), we assume the d −k is fixed throughout this proof. For our convenience, we will use G(d k ) to represent the graph G(d| k d k ). We first prove a series of lemmas that will be used to prove that our payment scheme satisfies IC. 
PROOF. Remember that the payment based on link qiqj is
In other word, the second part is also independent of d k . Now we can write the payment to a terminal v k based on edge q i q j as following: 
We now state the proof that payment scheme (4) satisfies IC.
THEOREM 9. Our payment scheme satisfies the incentive compatibility (IC).
PROOF. For terminal v k , if it lies its cost from
Thus, terminal v k won't lies it cost upward, so we focus our attention on the case when terminal v k lies its cost downward.
From Lemma 8, we know that
Thus, we only need to consider the payment based on edges in
If we remove the edge q 
We discuss them individually.
which implies v k will not benefit from lying its cost downward.
This inequality concludes that even if v k lies its cost downward to introduce some new edges in E k (c k ), the payment based on these newly introduced edges is no larger than the payment on some edges already contained in E k (c k ). In summary, node v i don't have the incentive to lie its cost upward or downward, which proves the IC.
Before proving Theorem 11, we prove the following lemma regarding all truthful payment schemes based on VMST.
PROOF. Again, we prove it by contradiction. Assume that 
When v k 's declare its cost as d k , the length of the path LCP(qi, qj, d) becomes c We now ready to show that our payment scheme is optimal among all truthful mechanisms using VMST. THEOREM 11. Our payment scheme is the minimum among all truthful payment schemes based on VMST structure.
PROOF. We prove it by contradiction. Assume that there is another truthful payment scheme, say A, based on VMST, whose payment is smaller than our payment for a terminal v k under cost profile d. Assume that the payment calculated by 
. From Lemma 10, we know that
Using Lemma 2, we know that the payment for terminal v k using algorithm A is p k (c) − δ, which is independent of terminal v k 's declared cost.
Thus, terminal v k has a negative utility under payment scheme A when it reveals it true cost under cost profile d| k d k , which violates the incentive compatibility (IC). This finishes the proof.
By summarizing Theorem 6, Theorem 9 and Theorem 11, we get Theorem 5.
Computational complexity
We now discuss how to compute the payment to every relay terminal efficiently. Assume that the original communication graph G has n vertices and m edges.
One naive method of computing the payment works as follows. We first construct the complete graph K(d) and then construct the spanning tree
It is easy to show the overall time complexity to construct
where r is the number of receivers. In order to calculate the payment for terminal 
forms the naive approach with time complexity O(n 2 log n + mn). When r is a constant, the time complexity of the above approach becomes O(n log n + m), which is optimum.
Node Weighted Steiner Tree (NST)
Compared with LST in link weighted network, the structure of node-weighted Steiner tree (NST) in a node weighted network is even tough. It is well-known [11, 13] that it is NP-hard to find the minimum cost multicast tree when given an arbitrary node weighted graph G, and it is at least as hard to approximate as the set cover problem. Klein and Ravi [13] showed that it can be approximated within O(ln r), where r is the number of receivers.
Constructing NST
We review the method used in [13] to find a NST. We first introduce some definitions that are essential to construct the NST. A spider is defined as a tree having at most one node of degree more than two. Such a node (if exists) is called the center of the spider. Each path from the center to a leaf is called a leg. The cost of a spider S is defined as the sum of the cost of all nodes in spider S, denotes as ω
(S). The number of terminals or legs of the spider is denoted by t(S), and the ratio of a spider is defined as ρ(S) = ω(S) t(S)
.
ALGORITHM 5. Construct NST
Repeat the following steps until no receivers left and there is only one virtual terminal left.
1. Find the spider S with the minimum ρ(S) that connect some receivers and virtual terminals. 1 2. Contract the spider S by treating all nodes in it as one virtual terminal. The contracted virtual terminal has a weight zero. We call this as one round.
All nodes belong to the final unique virtual terminal form the NST. THEOREM 12.
[13] The tree constructed above has cost at most 2 ln k times of the optimal.
VCG mechanism on NST in not strategy-proof
Again, we may want to pay terminals based on VCG scheme, i.e., the payment to a terminal
We show by an example that the payment scheme does not satisfy IR property: it is possible that some terminal has negative utility. Figure 5 illustrates such an example. It is not difficulty to show that, in the first round, terminal v k is selected to connect terminals s and q1 with cost ratio 
It is easy to show that we will select terminal q k+r−1 at round r to connect V r and q r+1 with cost ratio 1 k+1−r − 2 . Thus, the total cost of the tree N ST (G) is
When terminal v k is not used, it is easy to see that the final tree N ST (G\v k ) will only use terminal v 2k−1 to connect all receivers with cost ratio
. Notice that this condition can be trivially satisfied by letting = 1 k 2 . Thus, the utility of
, which is negative when k ≥ 8, and = 1/k 2 .
Strategy-proof mechanism based on NST
Notice, the construction of NST tree is by rounds. Following, we show that if terminal v k is selected as part of the spider with minimum ratio under cost profile d in a round i, then v k is selected before or in round i under cost profile
We prove this by contradiction, which assumes terminal v k won't appear before round i + 1. Notice that the graph remains the same for round i after the profile changes, so spider Si(d) under cost profile d is still a valid spider under cost profile d . Its ratio becomes ω 
If they are r rounds, we have an increasing sequence
. Following is our payment scheme based on NST. For a node v k , if v k is selected then it gets payment
Otherwise, it gets payment 0.
Regarding this payment we have the following theorem:
THEOREM 13. Our payment scheme (5) is truthful, and among all truthful payment schemes for multicast tree based on NST, our payment is minimal. So overall, v k will always choose to reveal its actual cost to maximize its utility (IC property).
PROOF. From our conclusion that
Next we prove that our payment is minimal. We prove it by contradiction, suppose there exists such payment schemeP such that for terminal v k under cost profile d, the payment toPi(d) is smaller than our payment. Notice in order to satisfies the IR, the terminal must be selected, so we assumeP
< 0, which violates the IR. This finishes our proof.
With Theorem 13, we only need focus our attention on how to get the value B i k (d −k ). Before we present our algorithm to find B i k (d −k ), we first review in details how to find the minimum ratio spider. In order to find the spider with the minimum ratio, we find the spider centered at terminal v j with the minimum ratio over all terminals v j ∈ V and choose the minimum among them. The algorithm is as follows. 
ALGORITHM 6. Find the minimum ratio spider
sorted in ascending order according to their weights.
Find the minimum ratio spider with center vj by linear scanning: the spider is formed by the first t ≥ 2 branches such that
c j + P t k=1 L k t ≤ c j + P h k=1 L k h for any h = t.
Assume that the spider with minimum ratio centered at terminal vj is S(vj) and its ratio is ρ(vj). Then the spider with minimum ratio is S = {S(vj)|vj ∈ V and ρ(vj)
In Algorithm 6, ω(L i (v j )) is defined as the sum of the terminals' cost on this branch excluding v j , and
If we remove node v k , the minimum ratio spider centered at vj is denoted as S −v k (vj) and its ratio is denoted as ρ
(vj) be those branches in ascending order before linear scan.
From now on, we fix d −k and graph G to study the relationship between the minimum ratio of spider centered at v j ρ(v j ) and d k .
If the minimum ratio spider with terminal v k has t legs, then its ratio will be a line with slope of 1 t . So the ratio-cost function is several line segments. Observe that the number of the legs of minimum ratio spider decreases over d k . Thus, these line segments have decreasing slopes and there are at most r segments, where r is the number of receivers. So given a real value y, we can find corresponding cost of v k in time O(log r). The algorithm to find these line segments is as follows. performance of structures for link weighted network with these structures for node weighted networks. Therefore, we consider LCPT(link weighted version), PMST and LST as one group for link weighted networks and LCPT(node weighted version), VMST and NST as another group for node weighted networks. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show different multicast structures when the original graph is a unit disk graph (UDG): two geometry nodes are connected if their Euclidean distance is at most the transmission range. Here, the grey nodes are receivers.
Fixed Transmission Range and Fixed Number of Receivers
In our first simulation, we randomly generate n terminals uniformly in a 2000f t × 2000f t region. The transmission range of each terminal is set to 300f t. For a link weighted graph, we assume the power needed to deliver a packet on a link e i is c i (
where κ is a value between 2 and 5. In our simulations, κ = 2.5 and c i is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution between 1 and 10. For a node weighted network, the weight of a node i is c i * 3 κ , where c i is randomly selected from a power level between 1 and 10. We vary the number of terminals in this region from 100 to 320, and fix the number of sender to 1 and the number of receivers to 15. For a specific number of terminals, we generate 100 different networks, and compare the performances of different structures according to six different metrics: average cost(AC), maximum cost(MC), average payment(AP) and maximum payment(MP), average overpayment ratio(AOR) and maximum overpayment ratio(MOR).
For a link weighted network, as shown in the upper figures of Figure 8 , all structures' cost and payment decrease dramatically as the number of terminals increase. The structure PMST has the maximum cost, payment and overpayment ratio. But one advantage of PMST is that it is a shared based tree: no new tree is needed when the source changes. LCPT is the most commonly used structure for source based tree, and it does win over the other two structures regarding AOR and MOR in our simulation. But in practice, people tend to care more about the actual cost (the so called "social efficiency") and the total payment. From this aspect, LST is the best candidate. Similar to LCPT, LST only needs information of LCP between terminals which can be obtained from the routing table for unicast. Thus, LST can also be implemented in a distrusted way but with more computational cost compared to LCPT.
For a node weighted network, as shown in the lower figures of Figure 8 , all structures' cost and payment also decrease as the number of terminals increase. Notice for structure VMST, we assume all receivers(senders) will relay message for free. Thus, in order to fairly compare the performances of these structures, we set all receivers' private cost to 0 for both LCPT and NST structure. Unlike in link weighted network, the cost and payment of VMST and NST are much lower than the cost and payment of LCPT although the previous two are shared based trees. As we expected, since VMST and NST have low costs, the maximum overpayment ratio of these two structures are very unsteady and much higher than the maximum overpayment ratio of LCPT.
Random Transmission Range and Fixed Number of Receivers
In our second simulation, we vary the transmission range of each wireless node from 100f t to 500f t. For a link weighted network, the cost c i of a link e i is (c 1 + c 2 (
, where c1 takes value from 300 to 500 and c2 takes value from 10 to 50. For a node weighted network, the cost ci of a terminal vi is (c 1 + c 2 ( r i 100 ) κ )/10, where c 1 takes value from 300 to 500, c 2 takes value from 10 to 50 and r i is v i 's transmission range. The ranges of c 1 and c 2 we used here reflects the actual power cost in one second of a node to send data at 2M bps rate.
Similar to the fixed transmission simulation, we vary the number of terminals in the region from 100 to 320, and fix the number of senders to 1 and the number of receivers to 15. For a specific number of terminals, we generate 100 different networks, and compare the average cost, maximum cost, average payment and maximum payment, average overpayment ratio and maximum payment ratio.
For both link weighted networks and node weighted networks, Figure 9 shows a result similar to the case with the fixed transmission range.
Random Transmission Range and Variable Number of Receivers
For a structure H, we define its cost density CD(H) =
c(H) r and payment density P D(H) = p(H) r
, where r is the number of terminals in structure H.
In our third simulation, we study the relationship between average cost(AC), average payment(AP), average overpayment ratio(AOR), average cost density(ACD), average payment density(APD) and the number of the terminals. We use the same power cost model in the previous simulation and the number of nodes in the region is set to 200. We vary the number of receivers from 5, 10, 20, · · · to 50. Figure 10 shows that when the number of receivers increases, under most circumstance, the overall payment and cost increase while the average cost and payment among terminals decrease. One exception is for node weighted networks. Notice in a node weighted network, we set all terminals' cost to 0. Thus, it is natural to expect that when the number of terminals is larger than some threshold, the total cost and payment will decrease since more terminals will relay for free. This simulation shows that more terminals in a multicast group can incur a lower cost and payment per terminal, which is one of the attractive properties of multicast.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied how to conduct efficient multicast routing in selfish wireless networks by assuming that each wireless terminal or communication link will incur a cost when it has to transit some data. For each of the widely used structures for multicast, we designed a strategyproof multicast mechanism such that each agent maximizes its profit when it truthfully reports its cost and when every terminal always forward others' traffic. The structures studied in this paper are least cost path tree, pruning minimum spanning tree, virtual minimum spanning tree and the edge(node) weighted Steiner tree. Extensive simulations were conducted to study the practical performances of the proposed protocols.
Notice that the payment to each selfish agent is at least its declared cost. This is necessary to ensure that the selfish agent is truthful. Clearly, agents will not participate if we pay less what their true cost are. If we pay the amount the agent asked for, an agent will have incentives to lie by asking more than its actual cost. In all our payment schemes, each agent already maximizes its profit when it reports its true cost even it knows the costs of all other agents! Notice that in the paper only the payment to one session is discussed. When the session is to be repeated, a natural question is how much we should pay for later sessions? One may argue that we only have to pay each agent its true cost for later sessions. Unfortunately, this will not work for selfish agents. When an agent knows that its payment will be its actual cost for later sessions, it could lie its cost upward. By doing this, it may lose for the first session, but the gains in the later sessions will compensate the initial loss. Results when the number of terminals in the networks changes from 100 to 320 for link weighted structures and node weighted structures. Here, we randomly set the transmission range from 100f t to 500f t. There are several unsolved challenges we left as future work. First, we would like to design algorithms that can compute these payments in asymptotically optimum time complexities. Second, in this paper, we only studied the tree-based structures for multicast. Practically, mesh-based structures maybe more needed for wireless networks to improve the fault tolerance of the multicast. We would like to know whether we can design a strategyproof multicast mechanism for some mesh-based structures used for multicast. Third, all of our tree construction and payment calculation are performed in a centralized way, we would like to study how to design some distributed algorithm for it. This paper will lay down a building block for further researches in designing truthful routing protocols for selfish wireless networks. In all our protocols, we assumed that the receivers will always relay the data packets for other receivers for free, and the source node of the multicast will pay the relay nodes to compensate their cost. The source node will not charge the receivers for getting the data. As future work, we have to consider the budget balance of the source node if the receivers have to pay the source node for getting the data; we also have to consider fairness of the payment sharing when the receivers will share the total payments to all relay nodes on the multicast structure. Notice that this is different from the cost-sharing studied in [8] , in which they assumed a fixed multicast tree, and the link cost is publicly known, then they showed how to share the total link cost among receivers. Another important task is to study how to implement the protocols proposed in this paper in a distributed manner. Notice that, in [22, 7] , distributed methods have been developed for truthful unicast using some cryptography primitives.
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